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ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A control statement

Draft · as at 13 November 2026 · Triodian Pty Ltd (ABN 34 703 647 750), Brisbane

Triodian does not hold an ISO/IEC 27001 certificate. This statement lists every control in Annex A of ISO/IEC 27001:2022 and says where Triodian stands on it today, so a client can read it against its own supplier review. It sits beside the security answers and the privacy notice.

Summary. 24 implemented, 54 partial, 15 not applicable, of 93.

Scope. The Triodian app suite as software, and a deployment Triodian administers for a client. In a client-run deployment the client’s own controls apply to its Cloudflare account, its people and its devices.

How to read it. Implemented means the control is in place and can be shown, usually in the code or its tests. Partial means part of it is in place, and the row says which part is not. Not applicable gives the reason. Rows marked To confirm describe Triodian as a company, not the software: they are written from what is known and are waiting on confirmation by Triodian’s director before this statement is given to a client. Control names are the short titles of ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A; read the control text in a licensed copy of the standard.

5 Organizational controls​

ControlNameStatusWhere Triodian stands
5.1Policies for information securityPartialTo confirm. Each repository has a SECURITY.md and this pack states how the apps are built and run. There is no single written information security policy approved by management yet.
5.2Information security roles and responsibilitiesPartialTo confirm. Code owners are named in each repository and deployment administrators are named per client. Security roles for Triodian as a company are not yet written down.
5.3Segregation of dutiesImplementedIn the apps, separation of duties is enforced by person on the server (a reviewer cannot review their own work; only counsel answers counsel questions). In development, a change needs a pull request and a code owner’s review before it reaches main.
5.4Management responsibilitiesPartialTo confirm. Management directs the security work through the development plan. No signed statement of management responsibilities yet.
5.5Contact with authoritiesPartialTo confirm. Incident contact is [email protected]. Contacts with regulators and authorities for a client deployment are set in the client agreement.
5.6Contact with special interest groupsPartialTo confirm. GitHub security advisories and Cloudflare notices are followed. No membership of a security forum is recorded.
5.7Threat intelligencePartialDependabot security updates and GitHub secret scanning are on for every repository. No wider threat intelligence process.
5.8Information security in project managementPartialSecurity items are tasks in the development plan and are tested like any other change. No separate project security procedure.
5.9Inventory of information and other associated assetsPartialThe repositories, Workers and databases of a deployment are listed by the installer and the practice hub. No asset register for Triodian’s own devices and accounts yet.
5.10Acceptable use of information and other associated assetsPartialTo confirm. No written acceptable-use rules for Triodian’s people yet.
5.11Return of assetsPartialTo confirm. Access to a client deployment is removed in Admin and in the Cloudflare account when a person leaves an engagement. No written leaver procedure.
5.12Classification of informationPartialThe apps carry the engagement’s privilege marking on every screen and output. Triodian has no classification scheme of its own for its internal information.
5.13Labelling of informationPartialEvery output is labelled with the privilege marking, its status and its version. Internal Triodian documents are not labelled to a scheme.
5.14Information transferPartialAll transfer is over TLS. Files leave an app only when a user exports them. No written rule on how exports are sent between people.
5.15Access controlImplementedOnly active users an administrator has added can use an app; every save is checked against the person’s role on the server, and a refused save is logged.
5.16Identity managementImplementedOne identity record per person in the shared identity database; an administrator adds, changes and deactivates users; changes are in the audit log.
5.17Authentication informationImplementedNo passwords on a client deployment: sign-in is a one-time code sent by Cloudflare Access to the person’s email. Sessions last 12 hours.
5.18Access rightsImplementedRoles are given per engagement by an administrator and can be removed at any time; the audit log records each change.
5.19Information security in supplier relationshipsPartialSuppliers are named in section 7 (Cloudflare, GitHub). No written supplier security procedure.
5.20Addressing information security within supplier agreementsPartialTo confirm. Cloudflare and GitHub are used on their standard terms. Terms with clients are for counsel (section 11).
5.21Managing information security in the ICT supply chainPartialDependencies are few, pinned and watched by Dependabot; the apps load no third-party scripts or fonts. No software bill of materials is published.
5.22Monitoring, review and change management of supplier servicesPartialTo confirm. Cloudflare and GitHub status and changes are followed informally. No recorded supplier review.
5.23Information security for use of cloud servicesPartialThe use of Cloudflare is described in sections 3 to 7, including the data-location limits. No written cloud exit test yet; the code is built to move (section 10).
5.24Information security incident management planning and preparationPartialVulnerabilities are reported privately through GitHub; incidents go to [email protected]. No written incident response plan yet.
5.25Assessment and decision on information security eventsPartialTo confirm. Events are assessed by the code owner. No written criteria.
5.26Response to information security incidentsPartialTo confirm. No written response procedure; notice times belong in the client agreement.
5.27Learning from information security incidentsPartialTo confirm. Fixes go through the same pull request and test path. No post-incident review record yet (no incident has been recorded).
5.28Collection of evidencePartialThe audit log and engagement history are append-only and stamped by the server. No procedure for preserving evidence outside the apps.
5.29Information security during disruptionPartialThe code is open source and each engagement exports as JSON, so work can continue elsewhere. No written continuity plan for Triodian itself.
5.30ICT readiness for business continuityPartialWorkers and D1 run on Cloudflare’s network. Backups and point-in-time restore are not yet set and tested for client deployments (section 10).
5.31Legal, statutory, regulatory and contractual requirementsPartialEach client’s obligations are for the client and its counsel. Triodian’s own obligations (privacy, contract) are with counsel for review.
5.32Intellectual property rightsImplementedAll code is under the Apache License 2.0 with a NOTICE file; third-party licences are kept with the code; the Triodian name and logo are trademarks.
5.33Protection of recordsPartialEngagement records are versioned and kept in the database; retention and disposal are set per engagement (development plan task ISO.9). No Triodian records schedule yet.
5.34Privacy and protection of PIIPartialThe apps hold names, work emails, roles and, in AI Board Direction, directors’ briefing answers; see docs/privacy.md. No member, customer or client personal information is held. Counsel’s review of the notice is pending.
5.35Independent review of information securityPartialNo independent review yet. A client may run its own penetration test against a test deployment (section 8).
5.36Compliance with policies, rules and standards for information securityPartialTo confirm. The automated tests check the apps against their own rules on every change. No compliance review of Triodian’s own practices.
5.37Documented operating proceduresImplementedInstallation, upgrade, archive and destroy are documented in this repository and were followed end to end (development plan task 4.4).

6 People controls​

ControlNameStatusWhere Triodian stands
6.1ScreeningPartialTo confirm. No written screening procedure.
6.2Terms and conditions of employmentPartialTo confirm. Confidentiality is a term of engagement for Triodian’s people; not checked for this statement.
6.3Information security awareness, education and trainingPartialTo confirm. No recorded security training.
6.4Disciplinary processPartialTo confirm. No written disciplinary process for security breaches.
6.5Responsibilities after termination or change of employmentPartialTo confirm. Access is removed when a person leaves; no written procedure.
6.6Confidentiality or non-disclosure agreementsPartialTo confirm. Confidentiality agreements with clients and partners are for counsel; not checked for this statement.
6.7Remote workingPartialTo confirm. Triodian’s people work remotely. No written remote-working rules.
6.8Information security event reportingImplementedEach repository’s SECURITY.md gives the private reporting route; incidents on a client deployment go to [email protected].

7 Physical controls​

ControlNameStatusWhere Triodian stands
7.1Physical security perimetersNot applicableTriodian keeps no premises or equipment that hold client data. The data is in Cloudflare’s data centres, covered by Cloudflare’s own certifications.
7.2Physical entryNot applicableAs 7.1.
7.3Securing offices, rooms and facilitiesNot applicableAs 7.1.
7.4Physical security monitoringNot applicableAs 7.1.
7.5Protecting against physical and environmental threatsNot applicableAs 7.1.
7.6Working in secure areasNot applicableAs 7.1.
7.7Clear desk and clear screenPartialTo confirm. No written clear-desk and clear-screen rule for Triodian’s people.
7.8Equipment siting and protectionNot applicableAs 7.1.
7.9Security of assets off-premisesPartialTo confirm. Administrators’ laptops can reach a Triodian-administered deployment. No written device rules.
7.10Storage mediaPartialTo confirm. Client data is not kept on removable media by design; no written rule.
7.11Supporting utilitiesNot applicableAs 7.1.
7.12Cabling securityNot applicableAs 7.1.
7.13Equipment maintenanceNot applicableAs 7.1.
7.14Secure disposal or re-use of equipmentPartialTo confirm. No written disposal procedure for Triodian’s devices.

8 Technological controls​

ControlNameStatusWhere Triodian stands
8.1User endpoint devicesPartialTo confirm. No written standard for administrators’ devices (disk encryption, screen lock, updates).
8.2Privileged access rightsPartialAdministrator rights in an app are given by name and logged. Cloudflare account access for a Triodian-administered deployment is held by named administrators; multi-factor sign-in to Cloudflare and GitHub is to confirm.
8.3Information access restrictionImplementedEach role sees and changes only what the method gives it; the server enforces this on every request.
8.4Access to source codeImplementedThe source is public by design. Changes need a pull request, a code owner’s review and passing tests; main is protected.
8.5Secure authenticationImplementedEmail one-time code through Cloudflare Access, then an HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Lax session. Single sign-on with the client’s identity provider is not yet built (section 5).
8.6Capacity managementNot applicableCapacity is managed by Cloudflare’s platform.
8.7Protection against malwarePartialTo confirm. No written malware protection standard for administrators’ devices. The apps accept no file uploads other than a small PNG logo and JSON or CSV read in the browser.
8.8Management of technical vulnerabilitiesPartialDependabot, secret scanning with push protection, and private vulnerability reporting. No independent penetration test yet.
8.9Configuration managementImplementedEach Worker’s configuration is in its repository (wrangler.jsonc) and a deployment is created by the installer, so it can be rebuilt and compared.
8.10Information deletionPartialThe runbook archives and destroys a client deployment. Retention period and disposition per engagement are recorded in set-up (development plan task ISO.9).
8.11Data maskingNot applicableThe apps hold no member, customer or client personal information to mask. Worked examples use fictional data.
8.12Data leakage preventionPartialThe apps hold conclusions about AI arrangements, not the client’s documents or data, but AI Use Assessment’s register is commercially sensitive. Exports are made by a named user and logged. Nothing limits what an export is used for once it leaves the app.
8.13Information backupPartialNot yet set and tested for client deployments (section 10).
8.14Redundancy of information processing facilitiesImplementedProvided by Cloudflare’s network for Workers and D1.
8.15LoggingPartialAudit log and append-only engagement history in each app; Cloudflare Workers Logs. No export to the client’s SIEM yet.
8.16Monitoring activitiesPartialWorkers Logs record requests and errors. No alerting on them yet.
8.17Clock synchronizationImplementedTimestamps are set by the server on Cloudflare’s platform.
8.18Use of privileged utility programsNot applicableThere are no privileged utility programs on the platform.
8.19Installation of software on operational systemsImplementedCode reaches a Worker only through Workers Builds from main or a named administrator’s deploy.
8.20Networks securityImplementedProvided by Cloudflare’s network; the apps expose only HTTPS.
8.21Security of network servicesImplementedAs 8.20.
8.22Segregation of networksImplementedEach app is its own Worker with its own database; apps reach each other only through service bindings.
8.23Web filteringNot applicableThe apps make no outbound web requests on a user’s behalf.
8.24Use of cryptographyImplementedAES-256 at rest and TLS in transit, with keys Cloudflare manages (section 4).
8.25Secure development life cycleImplementedPull request, code owner’s review, automated server and browser tests, and a suite test, on every change.
8.26Application security requirementsPartialSecurity rules (roles, refusals, structure checks) are written as tests. No separate written security requirements.
8.27Secure system architecture and engineering principlesImplementedrisk_appetite/docs/architecture.md sets out the design: server-side rule checks, no secrets between apps, adapters for identity and storage.
8.28Secure codingPartialOutput is escaped, saves are validated against a structure, and headers are set. No Content-Security-Policy header yet (section 8).
8.29Security testing in development and acceptancePartialAutomated tests include refused-save and access tests. No independent penetration test yet.
8.30Outsourced developmentNot applicableTo confirm. No development is outsourced.
8.31Separation of development, test and production environmentsImplementedTests run against a local database; each app has a separate test Worker and database from the live one.
8.32Change managementImplementedEvery change is a reviewed pull request with its tests; deployments are tied to commits.
8.33Test informationImplementedTests and worked examples use fictional organisations and people only.
8.34Protection of information systems during audit testingPartialA client’s penetration test runs against a test deployment made by the installer, under a written scope (section 8).

This statement describes the software and how Triodian runs it. It is not a certificate and is not an auditor’s opinion. Whether it meets a client’s obligations is for the client and its counsel.